The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is one of the key protocols in today's Internet. Routers use BGP to distribute interdomain routes to ensure that all networks attached to the Internet remain reachable. BGP was designed when security concerns and attacks where not as severe as they are today. Researchers and network operators have proposed several techniques to improve the security of BGP. Given the size of the Internet, it is impossible to entirely replace BGP with a new and more secure protocol. The only possibility to secure interdomain routing is to evolve BGP. One of these evolutions is the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). The RPKI is a custom PKI that provides attstation objects for various Internet resources (IP prefixes, AS numbers, . . . ). The RPKI publishes Route Origin Authorization (ROA) objects that specify which AS can advertise a given prefix. Thanks to these ROAs, routers can verify the validity of the routes that they receive via BGP. Several vendors have implement the validation of routes based on ROAs, but we do not really know whether ROAs are actively used in the field. This paper makes two important contributions to the analysis of the deployment of Route Origin Validation (ROV) based on RPKI data. First, it tries, but does not succeed to reproduce a measurement study published earlier about ROV. The authors explain in details why they could not reproduce this study. Then, they propose an active measurement methodology which allows to detect which ASes are actually using BGP Route Origin Validation. They use this methodology on current BGP routes and show that only a few ASes are currently using RPKI-based filters.
INTRODUCTION
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [17] is responsible for establishing Internet routes, yet it does not check that routes are valid. An autonomous system (AS) can hijack destinations it does not control by announcing invalid routes to them, either intentionally or unintentionally, as in the well-known accidental announcement of YouTube's address space by Pakistan Telecom [2] .
Because this critical aspect of the Internet is vulnerable, there are proposals to improve routing security [7] , and onethe RPKI-is standardized and is in early adoption. The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [12] is a specialized PKI to help secure Internet interdomain routing by providing attestation objects for Internet resource holders (i.e., IP prefixes and AS numbers). The RPKI publishes Route Origin Authorization (ROA) objects, each specifying which AS is allowed to announce an IP prefix. Using ROA data, a BGP router can perform RPKI-based origin validation (ROV) verifying whether the AS originating an IP prefix announcement in BGP is authorized to do so [14] and labeling the route as valid or invalid. The validity of a route can be used as part of the router's local BGP policy decisions, e.g., filtering routes that reflect invalid announcements or preferring valid ones. While the RPKI is fairly populated with ROAs and growing [9, 15, 23, 24] , adoption of ROV and filtering has been negligible, according to operator gossip. A major reason for this is the lack of economic incentives. Since a significant share of invalid routes are due to misconfiguration [23] , adopting ROV and filtering can even have adverse e↵ects such as a loss of connectivity to legitimate network destinations.
A recent paper examined RPKI and ROV adoption from multiple angles, focusing on the slow state of ROV adoption, the security implications of partial adoption, and reasons for slow adoption. The paper also identifies an attack vector that exploits loose ROAs to hijack tra c of a RPKI-secured prefix [5] . To capture the current state of limited adoption, the paper included a measurement study that claimed that most large AS had not deployed ROV, but that 9 of the 100 largest AS had. This result was based on observations of existing BGP routes from BGP route collectors, meaning that the experiments were uncontrolled. At a basic level, the approach finds an AS that originates both valid and invalid announcements, then identifies other AS that appear on paths towards the valid prefix but not on paths towards the invalid prefix. It then assumes these AS are performing ROV to filter invalid routes.
In this paper, we contribute a verifiable methodology for measuring ROV after demonstrating that the above approach to identify ROV adoption, based on passive observation of routes in uncontrolled experiments [5] , has three major limitations. First, our measurements show that its characterizations of some networks change depending on which set of BGP collectors is used, inferring ROV adoption in some cases when it definitely has not been deployed and not inferring it in some cases when it may have been deployed. Second, the approach relies on invalid routes that happen to be announced, and so its coverage is limited by their rare nature [8] . Third, we conducted supplemental measurements suggesting that most networks flagged by the approach (and by [5] ) as using ROV are actually avoiding invalid routes for unrelated (nonsecurity) tra c engineering purposes, without checking ROV status. This means that adoption is likely even lower than suggested by the earlier study. In fact, with only uncontrolled measurements of existing routes-the status quo for Internet research-it is impossible to di↵erentiate between multiple feasible explanations.
To overcome challenges of measuring route origin validation ( § 2) and the limitations of uncontrolled experiments ( § 3), we propose a method to accurately infer ROV policies using controlled experiments ( § 4) that manipulate both BGP announcements and the ROAs that apply to them. We discuss the operational concerns related to ROV deployment and sketch a roadmap for further, more general measurements ( § 5). We provide initial results using our method, verified by ground truth.
Although ROV adoption is low and slow, our proposed method allows accurate, longitudinal observation of ROV adoption across the Internet.
THE CHALLENGES OF MEASURING ROUTE ORIGIN VALIDATION
Limited visibility. Measuring the deployment of ROV is challenging because of very limited visibility of routing decisions, which has multiple causes. First, an AS does not propagate every path it knows, instead selecting a best path to each destination prefix and then choosing for each neighbor whether to export that best path. So, BGP hides information by only forwarding a subset of available paths to a subset of neighbors. Second, an AS can use arbitrary policy to select a best path and to decide which neighbors to forward it to, and this policy is opaque. The policy may reflect concerns such as business relationships and tra c engineering, as well as route origin validity, and so it can be very di cult to discern the cause of any observed decision. Third, the interactions of these policies can influence the decisions of seemingly uninvolved AS, meaning that it is not enough to observe a path before and after a change to understand which AS caused the change [10] . Fourth, as researchers, we typically have a limited view of the Internet, with projects such as RIPE RIS [18] and RouteViews [22] collecting routes from a small number of AS, many of which only provide their routes to a limited set of destinations [16] . This makes it hard to locate where routes diverge or whether di↵erences are due to actual filtering or simply lack of visibility. Lack of controlled experiments. We distinguish between two experimental methods, controlled and uncontrolled. In a controlled experiment, researchers vary one factor of interest (whether a route is valid) while fixing other factors, then measure the outcome (which route an AS uses), observing how networks route under di↵erent scenarios of interest to the current research question [10, 21] . In an uncontrolled experiment, the factor of interest varies outside the control of the researchers and independent of the current research question (AS on the Internet happen to announce a mix of valid and invalid routes), and researchers measure outcomes. Our classification of controlled versus uncontrolled describes experiments (how to test a hypothesis). It is orthogonal to the classification of passive versus active measurements (how data are collected ), and passive versus active measurements are orthogonal to control plane versus data plane measurements (what data are collected ). With uncontrolled experiments, inferring root causes of routing decisions is challenging because pinpointing the reason for the decision (e.g., RPKI policy or tra c engineering) is di cult when path attributes and RPKI data cannot be manipulated independently to observe their impact on decisions. Implementation variations. Uncontrolled experiments are most challenged when the baseline of the system is unclear or complex. The deployment of ROV introduces additional variations in implementation and configuration (e.g., ROA propagation delay [13] , route revalidation because of ROA change) that have not yet been explored but likely a↵ect measurement outcome.
REVISITING UNCONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS
A previous approach for detecting ROV deployment used uncontrolled passive measurements [5] . This study did not release the code and data sources needed to reproduce it. In this section, we try to replicate some of the results and analyze how reliably the method leads to the conclusions. We show that the limited view provided by vantage points can lead to incorrect identification of ROV non-adoption and ROV adoption. Our analysis shows that di↵erences in AS paths towards valid and invalid announcements are mainly a measurement artifact, instead of evidence for filtering. To be clear on terminology, a route collector is a BGP router that peers with border routers of various AS, each of which we refer to as a vantage point [20] .
Uncontrolled Method
The previous approach uses available BGP dumps and RPKI data to estimate a lower bound for ROV non-adoption and identify ROV filtering [5] . It compares AS paths taken by known ROV valid and known ROV invalid announcements from a single AS to a single vantage point. If the paths di↵er, it assumes that the invalid announcement was filtered by ROV on the path taken by the valid announcement, causing the divergence. This approach does not distinguish between a single router or an entire AS using ROV-based filtering, since it makes inferences based on the AS that appear on AS paths to vantage points. The method analyzes routes exported by vantage points as follows: Exclude AS observed to use invalid routes. First, any AS that is found on a path of an invalid announcement is flagged as non ROV enforcing. This assumes that any AS that accepts any invalid route accepts all invalid routes; i.e., AS do not implement selective filtering or use other policies that can accept some invalid routes while filtering others. An exception is made for invalid announcements originated by the vantage point's AS or by one of its customers [5] , as an AS may make exceptions for its customers. Identify AS that may be performing ROV filtering. For each vantage point, the approach identifies all AS observed to originate at least one non-invalid (either valid or not in the RPKI database) prefix announcement and at least one invalid announcement. It then compares each non-invalid path (from the origin to the vantage point) to each invalid path. If there is exactly one AS that (i) appears on the non-invalid path but not the invalid path, and (ii) has not been flagged as non ROV enforcing, the approach marks it as an ROV candidate for announcements from that origin.
For example, the vantage point V might observe the following paths for the non-invalid prefix announcements P 1≠2 and invalid prefix announcements P 3≠4 advertised from origin O:
In this case, AS C and AS E are marked as ROV candidates for origin O, unless they have been previously marked as non ROV enforcing. Select filtering AS. The approach then counts the number of origins for which it marked an AS as an ROV candidate and, following previous work [5] , classifies an AS marked for at least 3 origins as ROV enforcing.
Data Set and Comparison with Current Findings
Data Set. The previous study [5] specifies the data set they have used to be from July 2016, collected from 44 Routeviews vantage points. It does not mention which vantage points explicitly. Our analysis is based on BGP RIB dumps gathered from all route collectors of the RIPE RIS and Routeviews projects from October 25th 2016, 16:00 UTC. This data set includes 27GB of exported routes from 960 vantage points, a larger data set than the previous study has used. The data exported by the vantage points includes routes to both IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes.
Reproducing existing methodology. We reproduced the methodology from the description in the previous study [5] , since the original code is not available. Analyzing our complete data set using the uncontrolled method, it classifies the following AS as ROV enforcing:
AS8100 AS25761 AS17819 AS262150 None of these AS is among the top-100 AS, based on the CAIDA AS rank [4] . This result di↵ers from previous measurements [5] , which used a di↵erent set of RIB dumps to conclude that 9 of the top 100 AS enforce ROV. We want to better understand the validity of the method and why results vary significantly.
Impact of Limited Vantage Point Sets
When we run the same analysis on a subset of our data, such as data from a single route collector, the results di↵er. For example, the routeviews-equix collector has a feed from 34 vantage points, yet running the same analysis just on this feed results in zero AS marked as ROV enforcing. In contrast, the routeviews-wide collector has feeds from only 4 vantage points, but shows the following AS as ROV enforcing:
AS48237 AS262150 AS3786 Out of those 3 AS, AS48237 and AS3786 are both found on the AS paths of invalid routes when considering data from the route-views4 collector, classifiying them as non ROV enforcing, contradicting the previous ROV enforcing classification. This shows that using the uncontrolled methodology some AS might be (mis)classified as ROV enforcing if the invalid announcements they propagate are not visible in the data set, leading to false positives. We define an AS as a false positive if it is classified as ROV enforcing using data set d 1 , but classified as non ROV enforcing using data set d 2 , with d 1 encompassing d 2 . On the other hand, some AS that are classified as ROV enforcing in a more complete data set might not be visible enough in a smaller data set to result in a classification as ROV enforcing, leading to false negatives compared to the full data set. For example, using the complete data set, the approach marks AS8100 as an ROV candidate for origins AS6921, AS46562, and AS46261. It is thus flagged as ROV enforcing. When looking only at the data from the routeviews-wide collector, AS8100 is only marked as ROV candidate for a single origin, AS46562, and thus it is not classified as ROV enforcing.
This shows that results vary significantly depending on which set of vantage points the data is taken from. To quantify the impact of this we select 44 Routeviews vantage points (the number used in previous work [5] ) and calculate the number of AS identified in each step of the method (see § 3.1). Figure 1 summarizes statistical properties (quartiles, extreme non-outliers, and outliers) of 5,000 random samples of 44 vantage points, showing that, even for a fixed number of vantage points, results can vary widely depending on which vantage points are used. Results for a single selection of vantage points may not reliably determine a lower bound of either deployment or non-deployment. Figure 2 depicts the number of false positives of ROV enforcing AS, those classified as enforcing given sampled subsets of 44 vantage points but non-enforcing based on the global data set. For 82% of the samples, the ratio of false positives is 50% or more.
Conclusion. Using BGP RIB dumps as a basis for uncontrolled measurements of ROV filtering (or non-filtering) is problematic. It makes inferences based on routes visible in the selected dumps, but lacks complete visibility of the global Internet, leading to misclassification.
Impact of Limited Prefix Visibility at VPs
Recall that the existing approach to identify ROV filtering compares paths for invalid announcements with paths for non-invalid (i.e., valid or unknown) announcements. We have shown that the selection of vantage points has a major impact on classification using this approach. As the approach uses pairs of non-invalid and invalid announcements, it relies on vantage points receiving such announcements from enough origins to reveal their policies. Combining all dumps from the RIPE RIS and Routeviews projects, we have data from 960 vantage points. But, not all vantage points provide routes to the same set of prefixes. Some vantage points have a near global view, while some have routes for only a very limited number of prefixes.
For each vantage point, Figure 3 (a) shows the number of prefixes received via invalid announcements (top) and the number of distinct origins originating these announcements (bottom). Though some vantage points provide routes for invalid prefix announcements to nearly 1000 distinct origin AS, more than 36% of the vantage points see less than the needed 3 AS originating invalid prefix announcements. This observation is independent of the RPKI deployment state. Figure 3(b) shows the relative ratio of visible prefixes per origin and vantage point. Those vantage points that see many prefixes lack a complete view with respect to all prefixes per origin.
Conclusion. Assuming one applies the method with only a subset of VPs as in the previous work [5] , selecting vantage points with very limited prefix visibility misses a significant portion of origin AS, and thus underestimates the set of ROV candidates and can lead to misclassification.
Impact of Limited Control
Just because a vantage point uses di↵erent routes to reach a non-invalid and an invalid prefix from the same origin does not imply that the di↵erence is caused by ROV-based filtering, as invalid and non-invalid advertisements might di↵er in attributes other than RPKI validity. We now investigate tra c engineering as another possible explanation (unrelated to BGP security) for observed di↵erences. For a multi-homed AS, a common technique to influence inbound tra c is to announce di↵erent prefixes to di↵erent upstreams. These prefixes often overlap, e.g., an AS may announce a more specific prefix (a /24) via upstream A and the covering prefix (a /16) via upstream B to shift tra c to A. Studies comparing current ROAs to announced prefixes have shown that the major cause for invalid BGP announcements is issuing a ROA only for a prefix and then announcing subprefixes [6, 9, 23] which are not covered by the ROA. Announcing the /16 and /24 to separate providers then results in two routes, one valid and one invalid, diverging on the first hop of the AS path. For each vantage point, Figure 4 shows the fraction of prefixes from invalid announcements that are covered by a prefix from a non-invalid announcement from the same origin. An invalid prefix only counts as covered if the vantage point sees both the route to the invalid prefix and a route for the covering non-invalid prefix. For the vantage points between x = 0, 275, roughly 80% of prefixes from invalid announcements are covered by a non-invalid from the same origin. This strongly suggests that the prefixes are invalid because of incorrect ROA configuration and the announcements perhaps subject to tra c engineering.
Next, we investigate where the vantage points' paths to these invalid prefixes diverge from their paths to the covering prefixes. Figure 5 shows the distribution of divergence points for all vantage points. The y-axis sorts the vantage points by the number of invalid prefixes they provide routes to. The coloring of the x-axis depicts the fraction of these paths that diverged a given number of hops from the origin. The majority of AS paths of invalid routes either share the AS path of the covering non-invalid (x="Same path") or diverge at the first hop, as would occur with tra c engineering. Conclusion. ROV-based filtering is not the only plausible explanation for instances of vantage points using di↵erent routes to reach non-invalid and invalid prefixes from the same origin. We found that most instances display signatures of tra c engineering, and, during our study, we also observed a router selecting di↵erent routes from the same origin AS due to route age (a BGP tiebreaker).
CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS
With uncontrolled, passive experiments, it can be impossible to determine whether an AS is actually filtering or whether it is not using invalid advertisements because of other attributes. Further, the AS where the divergence occurred need not be the one that made a di↵erent decision, as it could have been presented with di↵erent options for its decisions. To overcome misclassification, experiments must clearly establish whether decisions stem from ROA status.
Controlled experiments provide a means to establish this causation despite our limited visiblity into routing decisions. Based on the challenges in measuring ROV adoption ( §2) and our experiences evaluating the existing approach ( §3), we arrive at the following requirements for a more reliable methodology. Experiments must be long-lived. Adoption is likely to be slow, and may be bursty, driven by various initiatives and technologies. Measurements must be rerun periodically. Experiments must be active and controlled. Passive observations of existing announcements are insu cient to determine a policy since we do not know precisely how the announcements are being made (i.e., tra c engineering or not) and route collectors may not provide the right vantage to locate filtering. Furthermore, we need to coordinate announcements with ROA changes to precisely expose policies. Experiments require rich BGP connectivity. From a single vantage point, it is di cult to infer which network along a path is filtering an announcement.
Basic Approach
We describe an approach based on active, controlled manipulation of BGP announcements and RPKI ROAs. We use the PEERING testbed, which allows us to make BGP announcements for prefixes we control from PEERING sites around the world to the hundreds of networks it peers with [21] . We use multiple /24 prefixes from the same /16 block. These prefixes share the same route object in the Internet Routing Registry. To control ROAs, we run a grandchild RPKI Certificate Authority (CA) in the RIPE region, enabling us to programmatically issue and revoke Resource Certificates and ROAs. Common RPKI cache server implementations by default update at an interval of 10 to 60 minutes. To guard against uncommonly long ROA propagation delays, we conservatively keep every configuration (set of BGP announcements and ROA states) in place for eight hours.
In our basic approach, an AS must fulfill two assumptions to allow us to unambiguously determine whether the AS is using ROV-based filtering: (i) connected-assumption. The network peers with PEERING, either directly or using a route server. (ii) visibility-assumption. The network o↵ers some means to check the BGP route it uses to reach an Internet destination, either via a Looking Glass or via a vantage point. While the connected assumption is limiting, it is necessary to maintain accuracy, relaxing it to allow networks that are not peers of PEERING introduces ambiguity. We discuss the possibility of relaxing the connected assumption, as well as the visibility assumption, in section 5.
We announce two prefixes via PEERING (AS47065), a reference prefix P R and an experiment prefix P E . We periodically change RPKI state for the experiment prefix, using an additional origin AS O to alternate between the following configurations:
(C1) ROA specifies AS47065 is valid for P R and P E , so both announcements are valid.
(C2) ROA specifies AS47065 is valid for P R , AS O is valid for P E . AS47065's announcement of P E is invalid.
We check the routes a vantage point chooses to both prefixes during both configurations. The reference prefix always has a valid RPKI state so should not be filtered via ROV, and so we omit any vantage points at which P R is not visible. We expect both prefixes to be treated the same as long as both announcements are valid, and so we omit a vantage point if it uses di↵erent routes during configuration C1. Analysing only data from vantage points that pass both these requirements eliminates the problem of limited visibility, since there is no missing data anymore. We then check the routes a vantage point has chosen after the announcement of the expermiment prefix becomes invalid. Three observations might occur: (O1) V has the same route for both prefixes P E and P R . (O2) V has a di↵erent route for prefix P E . (O3) V has no route to P E . In the cases of O2 and O3, we know that this route change must be because of the RPKI status change. Had it been for another reason we would expect a change in route for the reference prefix as well. The reference prefix combined with the ROA changes thus all but eliminates the problem of limited control. The experiments are repeated continuously to confirm the behaviour is consistent.
Measurements and Results
Experiment Reach. The experiments were conducted using PEERING BGP routers in Amsterdam and Seattle. The device in Amsterdam peers with 589 di↵erent AS, either directly or via a routeserver at AMS-IX. The device in Seattle peers with 179 di↵erent AS either directly or via a routeserver at SIX. In total, via these two location PEERING peers with 730 AS. Out of these 730 AS, only 138 AS peer with a RIPE RIS or Routeviews route collector. Out of those 138 vantage points, 68 actually export direct routes for prefixes announced by PEERING.
Results. These experiments were performed February 20-27, May 11-17, and August 1-7, 2017. In our experiments in February and May 2017, we found AS8283, AS50300, and AS59715 were using ROV to filter invalid announcements. AS8283 and AS50300 comply with both of our assumptions. The experiments in August show AS50300 and AS59715 to be filtering, but not AS8283. AS8283 was identified based on observation (O3), and AS50300 based on (O2). It is worth noting that AS50300 only filtered routes learned via a route server at the Amsterdam exchange (AMSIX). This contradicts one of the assumption in the methodology studied in section 3, whereas it is assumed that an AS found on the AS path of an invalid route does not use ROV based filtering.
AS59715 was not directly connected to PEERING but lead to (O3). For all three AS we contacted the operators via email and they confirmed that they used ROV based filtering. In the case of AS8283, they confirmed that they had shut o↵ ROV based filtering for technical reasons in July 2017. This confirms our findings from August 2017.
Relaxing the connected-assumption in the basic approach lead to ambiguity since multiple AS can be on the path between PEERING and a vantage point. To deal with cases such as AS59715 precisely, we propose a roadmap for a more general approach in the next section.
ROADMAP 5.1 Operational Concerns
ROA Propagation Time. Analysis of our experiments has shown that the time for some AS to receive newly issued ROAs can be up to 8 hours or more. We have also observed that the propagation time for some AS is inconsistent and varies by up to 2 hours. It is not clear yet whether this is due to RPKI cache servers updating infrequently or due to BGP routers using excessively long refresh intervals. Considering implementation variations. Active RPKI experiments require a careful check of router implementations [3] . For a router to perform ROV when an existing route changes from valid to invalid (due to an RPKI change), the BGP implementation must (i) receive the new ROA payload and (ii) recalculate the best path for this existing entry. We verified that Cisco and Juniper implementations do recalculate the best path upon ROA changes, however there are corner cases where certain Cisco implementations do not re-apply route-maps that change BGP path attributes based on RPKI validation. This might lead to a filtering AS to go unnoticed by our basic approach. To detect such cases we have set up a second set of experiments in which the BGP announcements are withdrawn prior to the ROA changes and then reannounced once the new ROAs have propagated. We have timed these announcements in such a way to minimize risk of BGP dampening. So far we have found no additional AS to be filtering in these experiments.
Analyzing router implementations in more detail, analyzing the consistency among RPKI cache servers, and measuring ROA propagation time to routers is part of our ongoing work.
Extending Controlled Experiements
Going forward, we plan to generalize our approach by conducting additional experiments, but also relaxing our assumptions without sacrificing the precise conclusions enabled by tightly controlled experiments. Relaxing connected-assumption. Suppose the target does not connect directly to PEERING and has no route to P E . It might check ROAs or might not receive a route from any neighbor. To narrow our policy inferences, we use two techniques. First, we iteratively target networks in a breadth-first search outwards from a PEERING site, similar to an approach that we used to uncover (non-security-related) routing policies [1] . Second, we will make multiple observations and only consider inferences consistent with all observations. We will make multiple observations both by using vantage points across the Internet and by targeting a network with di↵erent announcements. We can vary the announcements by changing which PEERING sites we use, which peers we announce to, and what BGP attributes we use to influence route selection and propagation. Relaxing visibility-assumption. Lacking a BGP feed from a network, we can measure the data plane. This is straightforward if it has a traceroute server or RIPE Atlas probe [19] . If not, we can ping a destination in the target network and check the PEERING site the reply arrives at, or use our Reverse Traceroute [11] . Inferring complex RPKI policies. A network may prefer valid routes over invalid but not drop invalid routes. In order to test for such policies, experiments must fulfil an additional requirement: Experiments require competing announcements. To identify prefer-valid policies, we need multiple simultaneous announcements for the same addresses. Since a single BGP session generally allows only a single announcement, the experiment must include sessions with multiple peers.
In order to test for such policies we announce two prefixes P R and P E identically, each from two di↵erent locations with two di↵erent ASN (61575 and 61576). Initially, we configure ROAs in such a way that announcements for P R from both origin AS are valid, and announcements for P E are invalid. We then announce P R and P E exclusively from AS61575 and check whether vantage points will receive these routes. We repeat the same step for AS61576. Once we have confirmed vantage points receive routes for P R and P E from both origin AS, we announce both prefixes from both origin AS simultaneously. Throughout the experiment, all announcements for the reference prefix P R will stay valid, while announcements for P E will vary like this: (C1) ROA specifies AS61575. Announcement of P E from AS61575 is valid, from AS61576 is invalid. (C2) ROA specifies AS61576. Announcement of P E from AS61576 is valid, from AS61575 is invalid. A vantage point might initially choose the route to AS61576 for both prefixes P R and P E . If the vantage point then switches to the route to AS61575 for prefix P E during configuration C1, this indicates a preference for valid routes over invalid routes. An even stronger indicator of this policy is when the vantage point then again switches its route for P E to AS61576 when configuration C2 begins. We can attribute these route changes to a prefer-valid policy, rather than a filter-invalid policy, since we have ensured that vantage points will choose invalid routes for P E from both origin AS. This reasoning works the same way if the vantage point chooses the route to AS61575 for prefix P R .
We can di↵erentiate these policies by configuring announcements from PEERING in such a way that a target network receives di↵erent combinations of valid and invalid prefixes through clients, peers, and providers, then observing its decisions.
There are subtleties in checking prefer-valid policies, as a network is "allowed" to use ROA status as one part of checking how preferred a path is, but, for example, it may prefer invalid peer routes over valid provider routes but not over valid peer routes. We will explore how best to capture these policies, building on our work on using PEERING to uncover (non-security-related) routing policies [1] .
Establishing a Monitoring Platform
We will deploy our methods on a live, publicly available monitoring platform: https://rov.rpki.net. Our measurements will run on an at least weekly basis, to report about the ongoing deployment of RPKI-based route origin validation and filtering. We hope that these results will not only help researchers to better understand new security protocols but also operators to identify mistakes and consider motivation in deployment.
With a longitudinal rather than one-o↵ study, we can evaluate the impact of e↵orts that, for example, routing registries, Internet exchange points, vendor updates, and operator organizations make to encourage BGP security adoption. Measurements of the e↵ect of such campaigns may yield a better understanding of how to spur uptake. With an Internet-wide characterization, our data may inform best practices, encourage adoption, and reveal topics worthy of study, and provide the basis for understanding overall coverage and e↵ectiveness.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discussed steps and results towards a rigorous methodology for measuring adoption of RPKI route validation and filtering. We showed that BGP data sets that are incomplete with respect to peering relations-as are all available public data sets-challenge any method based on passive uncontrolled experiments. We discussed several pitfalls. We identified that tra c engineering, combined with negligent ROA configurations, are largely responsible for the routing di↵erences between invalids and non-invalids. To allow for more solid conclusions, we argue for controlled experiments. In fact, our measurements in February, May, and August 2017 revealed three AS that already deploy RPKI-based filtering, which has been confirmed by the operators.
By controlling our own announcements, we can uncover policies proactively, yielding a richer understanding of adoption and configurations than is possible via passive observation of existing announcements; and potentially uncovering issues before they would otherwise manifest. Our ongoing measurements focus on RPKI validation at locations with high impact such as Internet exchange points. Notably AMS-IX started filtering invalid routes by default at route servers on October 20, 2017. Our public measurement platform will report on this.
Reproducibility
We make all source code as well as data used for both our attempt at replication of the uncontrolled methodology of [5] as well as our presented controlled methodology available at https://github.com/RPKI/rov-measurement-code. Our platform to continuously monitoring ROV adoption will be publicly available via http://rov.rpki.net.
